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WWII History: Following is an article describing the Canadian army and its environment during the campaign in Northern France in the Summer of 1944. It approaches the topic from many angles that affected the performance of the troops in the field. This article is a shortened and edited version of a longer paper, the full analysis is available on request. |
An Analysis of Canadian
Performance In Normandy
By: Russ Benneweis
3rd Para Bde. (NWHA)
Introduction
Warfare doesn't lend easily to complete successes, but easily produces total failure. Depending on the definition of success and failure, attacking a well-fortified determined enemy has a greater potential for the latter. Armies have never defended themselves to total victory, thus it was incumbent upon the Allied armies to attack the enemy and attempt to crush his will to fight on. This was the situation in which Canadian soldiers found themselves involved during the summer of 1944. That they played a significant role, quite out of proportion to their numbers, is indisputable. But were they a success or a failure?
Military history leads armchair generals to fight and re-fight battles from days gone by, all in hindsight of course. One thing that cannot be argued is the bravery and courage of the individual volunteer soldier of the Canadian Army as he cracked Hitler's vaunted Atlantic Wall on 6 June 1944, closed the gap at Falaise, opened the Scheldt seaway, crossed the Rhine River and knifed deep into Germany to aid in the total defeat of the Third Reich. This article will analyze the performance of the Canadian army in the campaign to rid Normandy of German forces.Strategy
The battle of Normandy is a difficult case study in terms of strategy. No one expected the Germans to continue stiff resistance west and south of the Seine River, once it became apparent that the Allies were on the continent to stay. Initial strategy was to land six assault divisions on a wide front with airborne divisions dropped on each end of the invasion for flank protection. Following the successful completion of this task, the Allies intended to build up supplies, conquer as many channel ports in the Brittany peninsula as possible, push the enemy eastward and make an assault crossing on the Seine thus forcing the Germans from France. However, "The Allies had landed in Normandy prepared for a war of mobility in which the tactical air forces and the armoured regiments would dominate the battlefield. Instead they were confronted with a German army able to maintain a continuous perimeter defence in-depth."
By late June the situation on the eastern flank of the Normandy beach-head, manned largely by Commonwealth troops, was grave. The Germans had positioned much of their armoured strength opposite the Anglo-Canadian forces, while leaving it to the infantry to hold the Americans in the bocage country. At this juncture, "Montgomery drew what was indisputably the correct conclusion from these events. If the British and Canadians could continue to hold the bulk of the German armoured divisions on their front through a series of limited attacks, they could wear down the Germans and create the conditions for an American breakout on the right." These strategic decisions were approved by Eisenhower and Bradley. Thus the now infamous Operations Charnwood, Goodwood and Spring were developed and carried out, with the Canadians playing an immense role in all three.
"On 16 July (it was estimated) there were 60 (German) infantry battalions with 250 tanks opposite the (Americans) and 70 (German) infantry battalions plus 500 tanks in the (Anglo-Canadian) area." It was terribly important to maintain this ratio thus allowing the American breakout operation, code-named Cobra, to take place on 24 July. On 21, July Monty "issued a directive which required 2 Canadian Corps to remain as active as possible so that the enemy would believe that we contemplate a major advance towards Falaise and Argentan. The Germans must...be induced to build up strength east of the Orne so our affairs on the western flank can proceed with greater speed."
This directive led to Operation Spring. Casualties for the Canadians in Spring were exceedingly heavy, especially with the infantry. It did, however, succeed in holding the German armoured forces in the east until the Cobra "breakthrough turned into the long awaited break-out." Lt.-General Guy Simonds, commander of 2 Canadian Corps, was to state that "The troops who bore the brunt of the heavy, unspectacular fighting south of Caen deserve just as much credit for the final result as do those who made the obvious gains at the other extremity of the front. General Eisenhower gave this as his own view in a public statement."
Following the dramatic turn of events on the western flank, the German responded by counterattacking towards Mortain. In their willingness to stick it out in France and fight to the end, the Germans necessitated the transformation of Allied strategy. The Mortain counterattack had formed a real opportunity to put into place a 'short envelopment' at Falaise instead of the longer, more sweeping attack strategically envisioned to trap the Germans at the Seine.
Destruction at Falaise
In doing so, Monty's choices "... required the forces on the left flank (the Canadians) of the Allied advance to fight with limited resources of both men and material. During the battles on the roads to Falaise...the Canadians were required to pay a high price for (strategic) decisions over which they had no control." Terry Copp, a prominent Canadian military historian, states that "Canadian... infantry casualties occurred at a much higher rate than in comparable British formations largely because Canadian troops were committed to action more often and in more adverse circumstances than their British counterparts were."
Incredibly it fell upon the beat-up and tired Canadians to continue south towards Falaise. Operations Totalize and Tractable were organized and carried out during this period. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, after a tough fight, captured Falaise, while the remainder of the 2nd Canadian Corps swept towards the Americans approaching from the south. The gap was closed on the evening of 21 August, and with it ended the Battle for Normandy. The Canadians played a large role in this clash, "quite out of proportion to the number of (their) troops involved." They did so with great bravery and elan.Operational Doctrine
The clear and concise doctrine adopted by the British, and thus the Canadian army, in the later stages of World War II was an artillery-based style, gleaned from experience in the African theater. Simonds realized that the Germans did not heavily fortify their forward defences, instead relying on defence in depth and large numbers of mortars and automatic weapons. Thus when attacked, the Germans would give a little and then hit back with heavy mortar fire and numerous counterattacks. Simonds considered the defeat of the counterattacks as the method of severely hurting the enemy and thus part of the original plan.
6 pder Anti-Tank Gun
Simonds's model is sound, but as Terry Copp points out, "...in practice the thinly armoured, undergunned Sherman tanks were seldom able to accompany the infantry onto the objective, and almost never able to stay to help meet the counterattacks." Because of the time necessary to bring up the towed 6 pounder and 17 pounder anti-tank guns, it was often the artillery which shot them onto their objective in the first place and kept them there.
Thus the British and Canadians came to rely on a heavy artillery based doctrine. That they did so was fundamentally correct for it evolved from the situation they realized they would have to face: "the necessity of attacking strong defensive positions with inferior armour and infantry weapons."Tactics
When studying the Canadian campaign in North West Europe, one cannot help but notice that the fire and movement tactic, taught by battle drill, and employed by the troops, was sound. There are few instances of complaints against Canadian troops when properly led in battle and many instances of great success. Tactical problems in the Canadian campaign in Normandy seem to arise from the handling of troops above the company level. Debacles at Tilly-la-Campagne, St. Andre-sur-Orne and Fontenay-le-Marmion exhibit a glaring weakness in battalion and brigade scale tactics.
Thus it seems that, while infantry tactics at the company-sized level and down were sound, command tactics left something to be desired. Montgomery echoed this sentiment when he stated "If the (Canadian generals) could only learn how to put their Divisions into battle properly, and how to keep firm control over the ship in a rough sea, ...then the corps would be unbeatable." "The soldiery in the Canadian Corps, (Montgomery) recorded, are probably the best material in any armies of the Empire."Terrain
The geographical features of any battlefield dictate how the fight will take place. The instigator rarely has the advantage when attacking and the Canadians in Normandy were prime examples of this. The Calgary Highlanders' war diary stated when moving forward that they "attacked over open country fringed by evil-looking woods". Terry Copp in his Maple Leaf Route video states that the terrain of Normandy posed real problems for the Allies. In the American Sector, Copp continues, the bocage country, consisting of small hedgerow enclosed fields, "gave every advantage to the defender". On the eastern sector occupied by the Anglo-Canadian forces, the land was open and gently-rolling, a "...plain of meadowland and wheatfields... abounded (by) small woods, orchards, and innumerable hamlets of solidly constructed stone houses and farm buildings."
Fighting in a village in Normandy.
The open countryside was considered by the Allied commanders to be prime tank country. Good tank country is, however, even better anti-tank country. The Germans massed their armoured divisions in the Caen sector, knowing full well that a breakout on their eastern flank would seal their fate in France.
No one can argue negatively that the terrain that the Canadians were forced to fight across was a huge problem, though some may not emphasize it correctly. It, perhaps, would have been less devastating to the Canadians had the Allies possessed superior armour and high velocity anti-tank weaponry than their enemy, but this was not the case as we will discover in the next section. Ask any veteran who fought in this campaign and he will respond that the exhausted Canucks were always attacking uphill against a heavily dug in enemy, thus making their achievements all the more remarkable.| Continued on next page. |
