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WWII History: Continued from the previous page. |
Armour
That the Canadians and their Allies faced a huge disadvantage in terms of armour is a definite understatement. A simple comparison between the two sides, of thickness of armour plating and penetrating power of the guns tells the story. The main battle tank for the Allies, the M4 Sherman medium, had 76 mm of frontal armour, and its 75 mm cannon could penetrate 60 mm of armour at 1000 yards. Compare this to the 100 mm of frontal armour on the German Panther and Tiger tanks, both of which could penetrate over 102 mm of armour at 1000 yards with their high-velocity 75 and 88 mm guns, and it's easy to recognize the extreme danger that faced Canadian tankers.
Not until the introduction of limited numbers of the Sherman VC Firefly with a high velocity 17 pounder capable of penetrating the frontal armour of the main German tanks did the Allies have a weapon that placed them on nearly even terms with their enemy. The Firefly, however, had drawbacks: there was no upgrade in the armour over the M4, the 17 pounder gun was much longer with a muzzle brake compared to the short barreled 75 mm on the M4 (leading the Germans to concentrate their fire on the former) and during the campaign in Normandy the 17 pounder was unable to fire a High-Explosive shell, only Armour Piercing (AP). This rendered the Firefly to a tank-killer role as it was unable to support the infantry.
Passing a burning Sherman.
This disadvantage was to change the Allied armoured battle doctrine greatly. "What the infantry wanted from the tanks was close support, machine gun fire and mobile gunnery that could be brought into action ... against (the) enemy. The tankmen knew that if they tried to meet these demands the German tanks and A/T guns would destroy them with ease. Consequently, armoured doctrine called for indirect support for the infantry, firing from the flank or the rear, hugging dead ground and avoiding enclosed or wooded areas." This was a far cry from what was intended of the tanks, and led to many problems for the Canadians and undoubtedly much higher casualties for the infantry. Considering the severe disadvantage of the Allied armour and the propensity for the Sherman to brew up immediately upon being hit, the Canadian tank crews performed admirably. This is not to say that in certain situations they were poorly led, or pursued improper tactics, but more of a generalization that they did their best, very bravely, in a lop-sided battle.Morale
The individual Canadian soldier is a fascinating case study in bravery and determination. Basically carrying the same weapons as his father in World War I, he fought aggressively (usually on the attack, which is much more difficult than defending), while tired, dirty, wet, cold and with seemingly no hope of respite. The morale of the troops in many cases during the Normandy campaign could not have been much lower. Battle exhaustion rose at an alarming rate. Tank squadrons were being decimated by the feared '88, infantry losses in the 2nd Division's primary Normandy battles were extremely high, and the 3rd Canadian Division had been in action seemingly without hesitation since 6 June.
Captured village in Normandy.
Close support of troops by air was in its infancy during the Normandy campaign. Overhead the Canadians, Typhoons whistling towards the enemy and the goose bump-causing whoosh of 3-inch rockets streaking to earth were great morale boosters. In recent years, however, research has shown the effects of these attacks were quite limited. While the Tactical Air Force (TAF) did destroy a number of armoured vehicles during the Mortain counterattack and the Falaise retreat, studies by the 21st Army Operational Research Section concluded that claims by the pilots were quite exaggerated. In fact a study by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force "concluded that the probability of pilot error and the likely inaccuracy of rocket and bombing attacks meant that close support of army operations should only be ordered in an emergency." Thus the TAF aided by slowly wearing down the Germans, not by providing close direct support to the soldiers.
Huge four-engined heavy bombers were utilized many times prior to the invasion to soften up the enemy, as well as in the following months to aid the progress of the battle. Results were mixed in all situations, for the carpet bombing techniques used helped the initial assault, but did little when attacking an enemy that prepared defences in depth. In many cases it caused cratering and damage to towns and cities that rendered the roads and streets impassible to armour. Without a doubt, "heavies" were terrific morale boosters for the Canadians, helped to soften the initial defences and deflated the Germans immensely on the receiving end. Morale that was built up, however, was quickly deflated in several cases by inaccurate bombing.
Typhoon ground-attack aircraft.
Thus the TAF and the "heavies" aided the Canadians and her Allies to victory, but were not the tremendous asset that many historians purport. These historians are quick to argue that the Allied troops were inferior to their German enemy and succeeded only because of factors such as air power. Clearly the air forces, while providing definite benefits, took a backseat to the infantry, including the Canadians, in routing the boche from Normandy.Conclusion
The Canadians performed magnificently in their role on 6 June 1944. The Canadians made the deepest penetrations on the day of the invasion, and a unit of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was the only unit of the entire Allied army to achieve it's D-Day objectives.
Following the great successes of the initial landings were operations such as Windsor, Charnwood, Atlantic, Spring, Totalize and Tractable which were far from complete successes. They were not, on the other hand, failures. In spite of appalling casualties in some of the operations, each did it's part in tying down the German armoured forces on the eastern flank, thus allowing the American breakout at St. Lo and the eventual tightening of the neck on the Falaise Gap.
Questionable leadership and strategy were abundant during these operations, but never was the courage and bravery of the Canadian soldier questioned. Problems were not limited to the Canadians though. The German counterattack at Mortain can only be considered a monumental failure. Bradley stopping Patton at Argentan was the classic error committed in the Normandy campaign. In protecting the strong, fresh American army which could have been in Falaise a day or two after they reached Argentan, Bradley lost a chance for a quick conclusion to the campaign.
In another case a French Division, under the command of Patton, ignored orders and used a highway designated for an advancing American division. The ensuing confusion set the Americans back for most of a day, and allowed the feisty Germans to greatly strengthen their defences in the area. Later the same French Division was within site of the gallant 1st Polish Armoured Division fighting for its very existence near Chambois. Instead of helping their ally, the French turned east and headed for Paris much to the chagrin of the Poles. It seems the glory of liberating Paris was more important than saving the lives of Polish Allies and defeating the enemy.
Advancing through a field in Normandy.
Some historians argue that following Operation Spring, the fact that the Germans were able to transfer a percentage of their armour to the western flank for the Mortain counteroffensive shows a weakness in the Allied strategy. This argument is refuted by the fact that the large American breakout against relatively thin German armour had already taken place by the end of Spring. On the contrary, once in the attacking mode during the Mortain debacle, much of the German armour remaining in Normandy was decimated. The counterattack failed miserably. That the Canadians succeeded as well as they did in their attacks put in on similar defences south of Caen, while not suffering such a disastrous defeat, is a testament to the soldiers and their leaders.
Following a detailed and careful examination in regards to the performance of the Canadian Army in North West Europe, one has to remark of the tenacity and bravery shown by the volunteer soldiers. That the Canadians played a role in the defeat of the Germans vastly out of proportion to their numbers is clear. Also clear is the fact that, at many times, it was an extremely rocky and painful road to eventual victory at Falaise.
The fact that the Canadians contributed greatly to victory in Normandy, in spite of low morale, appalling casualties, poor leadership and difficult terrain is a testament to the quality of the men. Through experience from the African campaign, a general artillery-based doctrine, that succeeded in blasting the troops onto their target, was developed. Such a doctrine was necessitated by the inferiority in Allied armour and large calibre anti-tank weapons.
Great debates have occurred since the fighting in Normandy, over the strategies employed by the Allied generals. One thing abundantly clear is that by the end of June, it was apparent to Montgomery that it was necessary for the Anglo-Canadians to hold the bulk of the German armour in the eastern sector to allow the breakout to occur on the American flank. That Montgomery maintained, until his death, that holding the German armour on the eastern flank was in the plan for the Normandy campaign prior to the invasion only lowers the British General's prestige. No one could have predicted that the German Army would fight so heavily west of the Seine once it became apparent that the Allies were on the continent to stay and that Hitler would order the insane Mortain counterattack that allowed the short envelopment at Falaise.
Canadian casualties were high that fateful summer, exceedingly high as a matter of fact, but when the final count of enemy losses was tabulated, the Battle of Normandy, in which the Canadians played a huge role, was a resounding success.
