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Historical Focus - Dieppe: Following is a historical account of the Dieppe raid carried out in August 1942 by troops of the Second Canadian Infantry Division and support elements from the Calgary Tanks, the Royal Engineers, and No 3 & No 4 Commando. |
The Raid at Dieppe
August 19th, 1942
The raid at Dieppe, France by the Second Canadian Division in 1942 was a watershed event of the Second World War. It signaled a change from the dark years of desperate defense when Britain stood largely alone to a new time of offensive action by a great alliance whose nation members spanned the globe.
Still, as 1942 began, the outcome of the this struggle was very much in doubt. France was defeated and silent. The Commonwealth forces still reeled from disasters in Asia, Greece, and Africa. America was only beginning to make her presence felt, and the Soviet Union had been shocked by invasion and threatened with annihilation. It was in this atmosphere of trepidation and uncertainty that the Dieppe raid was born. Its failure both tested and sealed the new alliance, and if its cost was dear, it paid for the experience that would in time prove itself in victory.
In June 1941 the invasion of the Soviet Union began with Operation Barbarossa. Hitler sent 145 of 205 available divisions to the new eastern front. The success of the Wehrmacht was stunning, and only winter gave Stalin a reprieve. As 1942 began a new German offensive loomed, and the Soviets turned to their allies for aid. They called on the Western powers to open a second front in Europe and split the German resources.
Raid CO, General Roberts
Stalin's plea was met with sympathetic ears by the people of both America and Britain. In England the Soviet cause for action was championed by Lord Beaverbrook, the former Minister of Aircraft Production during the Battle of Britain and a hero of the nation. He turned his newspapers into a powerful weapon of criticism against the government of Winston Churchill and his Conservative Party, calling for an end to inaction and for an invasion of France.
America was also compelled towards action. Roosevelt and General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, proposed an invasion for the Spring of 1943, codenamed Operation Roundup. It was to compose 48 divisions; 30 American and 18 British. Along with this came the call for an operation in 1942 if the Soviets appeared close to defeat. This stop-gap operation, codenamed Sledgehammer, was to be a limited cross-channel operation involving 12 division; 2 American and 10 British.
The British government and military were unified against these proposals. Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, felt that any offensive action in Europe in 1942 would be disastrous, and would only serve to delay the eventual invasion. Churchill agreed with Brooke's analysis, and wished for the American forces to be used in an invasion of French North-Africa rather than Europe. Still, he felt compelled to offer his agreement to the Sledgehammer and Roundup plans under the combined pressure of his allies. However, it appears that from the moment Churchill agreed to the ambitious American plans he was looking for ways to replace them with his preferred course of action.
In June 1942, 30,000 Commonwealth troops surrendered at Tobruk in North Africa to General Rommel. This forced a reconsideration to the Sledgehammer-Roundup plans. With the Commonwealth forces falling back to Egypt the use of British troops for a 1942 invasion of Europe was out of the question. The need to relieve the pressure on North Africa heightened, and Churchill used this moment to ask Roosevelt to call off the Sledgehammer-Roundup operations. In their place he proposed a British 'super-raid' against the French coast in 1942 and an American invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch). The Americans agreed and now the British had to 'ante-up' their promised action.
The idea of a large-scale raid was motivated in part by the success of Lord Louis Mountbatten as Chief of Combined Operations. Mountbatten was a proponent of commando actions, and had pushed for the creation of a separate organization which could bring together the diverse resources needed for such operations. His staff and men had become adept at planning and executing successful attacks against occupied Europe. The morale of the British people was greatly improved by these raids, which pioneered both sea-landing techniques and the combined use of air, sea, and land power. From Combined Ops the plan for an attack against Dieppe was taken. The original plans for such a raid were rapidly modified to fit the expanded number of men and larger goals, and given the codename of first Rutter and later Jubilee.
The Cliffs at Dieppe.
The port town of Dieppe lies on the French coast approximately halfway between Calais and Le Havre. The town itself was a favorite pre-war vacation site, scenically surrounded by high chalk cliffs. Its beaches were composed of crushed shale to a depth of several feet, and sloped off at a high angle. The beaches were held back by a high concrete sea wall which ran the length of the town.
Several late changes were made to the plans which would have an important impact on their outcome. A large preliminary bombardment by 800 aircraft was cancelled on both political grounds and the idea that it would cause the streets of Dieppe to fill with rubble and slow the advance of armor. The original planning had called for the 1st Parachute Battalion to be dropped on the flanks and rear of the German positions in order to disrupt and confuse their defense and impede the ability of reinforcements to deploy. This was changed in favor of sea-landed commandos on both flanks, who were to push inland and destroy two key artillery positions.
The decision to replace paratroopers with commandos was taken when intelligence reports placed the 10th Panzer Division within a day's march of Dieppe, requiring the duration of the operation to be cut. It was felt that the inclusion of an airborne drop extended the duration of the operation too long and would give this powerful veteran German division time to counter-attack. Another change was to give two aging destroyers the role of close-support in the place of battleships or cruisers, whose presence in daylight on a foreign coast was deemed too risky.
Map of Dieppe Raid.
(Click for full size.)
While concerns were expressed over the development of the plans they seemed to be driven on by political concerns. Sir Alan Brooke indicated that the assault was necessary so that the planning staff could gain a true understanding of the requirements for sea-borne assaults in anticipation of a full invasion of France in following years. The political will also pressed hard for some type of action, regardless of the consequences. Concerns over casualties were parried by the comment that the Russians were said to be losing ten thousand men each day. With so much importance attached solely to the act of carrying out the raid, and with so little importance attached to its goals or success, it was inevitable that the plans would be carried out over any military objections.| The Dieppe Raid continued... |
The sea wall at Dieppe.
The final state of the plans called for the Second Canadian Division commanded by Major-General Roberts, along with supporting forces, to land in three locations near the town of Dieppe. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) and the Essex Scottish would make a frontal assault on the beaches at the town itself, supported by the Calgary Tanks, the Royal Engineers, a group of fifty men from the 1st U.S. Ranger Battalion and a Royal Marine landing party. East of the town the Royal Regiment of Canada (Royals) would land at the beaches at Puys. West of the town the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada were to land at Pourville. Both of the flanking assaults were to take place under the cover of darkness. Their objectives were to take the high ground around Dieppe before the main assault arrived. The Fusiliers Mont-Royal would act as a tactical reserve, and were to form the defensive perimeter when the other battalions were withdrawn. In total, there were 4,963 Canadian troops and 1,075 British troops assigned to the raid.
On August 19th, 1942, the attack commenced. Several incidents worked against the attacking Canadians. The local German commander had put his troops on early morning alert due to the combination of tide and weather making an assault likely. In addition, a naval gun-battle between the escorting force and a German convoy just prior to the assault further alerted the defense in the Dieppe area.
In the darkness of the early morning the assault troops began to land. On the western flank No. 4 Commando under the famous Lord Lovat moved rapidly inland and destroyed the German battery at Varengeville, overrunning the defenders with the bayonet. On the eastern flank No. 3 Commando, hampered by the loss of most of its men from misplaced landings, met much stiffer resistance. Their numbers were too low to undertake a general assault on the battery that was their objective, and could only lay down harassing fire. This was enough, however, to keep the guns from firing at the Dieppe beaches or the invasion flotilla.
View of the Dieppe Coastline.
The main assaults by the Canadian infantry began with equally mixed results. In the west, between No. 4 Commando and the town of Dieppe, the South Saskatchewan Regiment landed on schedule and with the element of surprise. They were able to the take the village of Pourville, their first objective, but were then quickly contained by the defendors. Heavy fire from the headlands above the village, compounded by their regiment having been dispersed from poor landings, served to limit to advance to the Pourville.
On the eastern flank, between No. 3 Commando and the town of Dieppe, the Royals landed at the village of Puys forty minutes late and in daylight. The activity of the commandos to their left had fully alerted the defenders on the high ground, and the assault foundered under a devastating fire. Pre-laid fire plans by the German troops decimated the attackers, and only fifteen of 150 men in the first wave crossed the beach to reached the safety of the sea wall.
At the same time the main attack was also beginning as the RHLI and Essex Scottish landed at Dieppe itself. The Canadian troops took fire from three sides from well-prepared positions, many in the towering cliff-sides and the fortified buildings. Without adequate bombardment from air or sea the high sea wall and barbed wire obstacles remained unbroken. For the most part the assault troops were unable to even advance off the beach. Without cover, the men could only hope to reach the relative safety of the sea wall, from which they could fire back at the unseen enemy. Very few men were able to reached the town of Dieppe itself. Only fourteen men from the entire Essex regiment reach Dieppe, eventually they ran out of ammunition and were forced to withdraw back to the beaches.
To the west the second wave then began to land. The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders followed the South Saskatchewans at Pourville. They had expected to land unopposed and move rapidly inland to secure their objectives. Instead, they met with a prepared enemy on the high ground overlooking their landing area, and took heavy fire before they could even leave the beaches. Nevertheless, the regiment was able to push back the resistance and move three miles inland, the deepest penetration of any unit that day.
On the main beach several attempts were made to reinforce the first regiments as they foundered against the sea wall. The Calgary Tanks, equipped with Churchill tanks, and Royal Engineers landed in support of the infantry. The tanks' tracks sunk deep into the loose rocks of the beach and became mired. Unable to even reach the sea wall, they were easily destroyed by German guns as they lay in the open. The engineers did not survive in numbers great enough to bring their explosives to bear on the barbed wire, and so this support was ineffectual as well. With radio contact hampered by the intense action and with a thick smoke covering the beaches, General Roberts remained unsure of the actual situation. From his position off-shore he ordered the reserve regiment to land at the main beach. Thinking that the first wave had entered the town, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal attacked into a maelstrom of fire, taking severe losses.
Casualties and Wreckage on Dieppe Beach.
When the true situation became known the flotilla began an attempt to evacuate those left on the beaches. Due to the confusion of the situation their efforts were uncoordinated and largely ineffectual. More success was had in bringing troops off the further west one went in the operational area. Four hours after the first assaults began those left on the eastern flank surrendered, followed soon after by the troops further west. The severity of the fighting is illustrated by the loses of the Essex Scottish regiment. Of 553 men there were 530 casualties: 382 of which were prisoners. Only 51 returned to England, half of which were wounded. Below is a list of the fatal casualties from the Canadian Infantry Regiments participating in the Dieppe raid.The Royal Regiment of Canada 227
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 197
Les Fusiliers Mont Royal 119
The Essex Scottish Regiment 121
The South Saskatchewan Regiment 84
The QOCHofC 76
Total casualties for the raid were nearly 4000, with 1874 prisoners of war. In addition to the heavy casualties among the infantry, the Royal Air Force lost 62 pilots and 106 aircraft, its highest one-day total of the war.
The Aftermath - POWs at Dieppe.
Sources
Whitaker, Denis. Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1992
Ziegler, Philip. Mountbatten, Knopf, New York, 1985
