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Responses - Dieppe: Following are several responses by NWHA members to the question of why the Dieppe raid failed and what it's significance might have been to the course of the war. You too can see your words here! The topic for upcoming newsletters will be circulated at events and is open to all. |
Dieppe: Wasted Valor, Lessons learned?
Tony S - 3rd Para Bde
The "raid" on Dieppe is viewed as a shameful waste of manpower. The raid had been planned to employ British Army and Royal Marine Commandos, and British Airborne troops. However, for political reasons the Canadian troops were pressed into use by the "powers that be" taking the place of the Royal Marines. The Canadians were itching for a fight, having been overseas for many months with no action, but were untested in combat. They were presented with a frontal attack on a beach backed with high cliffs and within a short distance of German reinforcements. Originally a bombardment was planned but canceled due to political reasons. This overrode the recommendation of Combined Operations HQ. Serious intelligence errors were made when major gun batteries did not show up on aerial photographs.
The one certain thing is the valor of the troops who assaulted Dieppe. Against overwhelming odds the British and Canadians threw themselves against the cliffs. The commandos, who were experienced fighters and specially trained for amphibious assault, performed magnificently. The Canadian infantry were slaughtered on the open beach by the German guns on the cliffs above. The RAF also bled during the Dieppe raid, suffering the loss of 165 aircraft and inflicting the loss of 48 aircraft on the Luftwaffe. The RAF did however protect the invasion force and only one RN ship was sunk due to aircraft.
The lessons learned from the Dieppe raid were many: Air superiority was a must, channel ports were too costly to invade, preinvasion bombardments were necessary, massive intelligence gathering was necessary, and finally the troops must be trained to the highest level. But, were these lessons worth the troops who were killed and captured, especially the highly trained commandos, and RAF pilots? Finally, why were the Canadian troops substituted for the RM Commandos and why did they make such an unnecessary frontal attack on a heavily defended enemy position? It is said these lessons were necessary for the Normandy invasion, however, these lessons were not put into use for the Allied landings in the Mediterranean theater, only a year or two later.Major General John Hamilton Roberts:
The Scapegoat of Dieppe
James P - QOCHofC
One of the most shameful actions to come out of the Dieppe fiasco was the removal of General "Ham" Roberts from command of the Canadian Second Division. General Roberts was made to be the scapegoat for all that went wrong on the whole Dieppe operation, when in fact most of the blame should be laid at the feet of two great English gentlemen, Sir Bernard Law Montgomery and Lord Louis Mountbatten, and to a lesser extent the Commanders of the Canadian Army Gen. Andy McNaughton and Gen. Harry Crerar.
Both Monty and Mountbatten came up with the idea of a large-scale raid on the French coast and planned the entire operation from top to bottom. The raid as originally planned may have worked but as time progressed too many important elements were withdrawn. These included battleship bombardment, British Paras and air force bomber involvement. In the end both Monty and Mountbatten decided that surprise would overcome firepower.
Before the raid was to take place Monty was called to go to North Africa to command the Eight army to victory. Then due to the element of surprise being lost the raid was called off. At the time there was great pressure to start a second front and, in an effort to appease the Americans and Russians, the raid was back on. Mountbatten, McNaughton and Crerar knew fully that the raid was flawed and that surprise had been lost but none of these men made any effort to have the raid called off.
Enter General Ham Robberts. As the commander of the Canadian Second Division he has been handed a plan and told to make it work. He has a decision to make: if he were to resign would that stop the raid from happening? No, if he did his superiors would just replace him and go ahead with the raid. So he makes the fateful decision that his place must be beside his men.
The raid takes place and the Second Canadian Division is decimated. Less that half make it back to England, and a large part of tho who do are wounded. Effectively the Division ceases to exist and someone needs to be blamed for the defeat. General Roberts is the logical choice, and his career is brought to an abrupt end. As he refuses to blame others or even talk about Dieppe he takes the whole burden upon his shoulders till the end of his days. I believe that General Roberts is a hero in his own right. He stayed by his men and then chose the way of an officer and a gentleman by refusing to lay the blame anywhere but on his own shoulders.Failure in Leadership
Rob M - 3rd Para Bde
The lion's share of the blame for Dieppe is often put on Montgomery and Mountbatten. I would suggest that this blame should be shared with Churchill, who insisted it take place, and General Roberts, who ultimately had responsibility for the plans and their execution.
Montgomery was at the time an unproven but highly regarded general. He commanded the army from which the Canadian troops were drawn. However, while his influence may have been great and he was always willing to give lots of advice, he held no responsibility for the planning at Dieppe. In fact, when he felt that the plan could not achieve real surprise and that the numerical odds were too far against success he recommended canceling the raid -- advice which was ignored.
Mountbatten is similarly a target of blame for Dieppe. Yet his original plan was designed to use only 500 commandos in a night-attack. The value of that original plan is borne out in measure by the success of those same commandos in the actual raid. Once the plan was pulled from Mountbatten's files, he lost control over its form and execution. In fact, Mountbatten argued for the use of battleships in the close-support role -- advice which was ignored.
Churchill clearly needed this operation to happen in order to further Britain's long-term political and strategic goals. Throughout the war he meddled in military operations, and usually was successfully rebuffed by the commanders in the field, although sometimes at the expense of their jobs! He pressured for a number of changes to the Dieppe plan, all of which seem designed to cause failure. Yet ultimately his job was to see towards the political considerations of keeping the United States and the Soviet Union in the war. So in this respect he was successful. It was the military commanders who failed in their jobs, not the political leaders.
In the end, some responsibility must lie with the commanding officer, General Roberts. It is true he was not given the power to choose and coordinate supporting naval or air assets, and that he was subject to the will of the Canadian and British governments. Still, it is unfortunate the Roberts did not insist on having the resources to match the responsibility. Commanders in other theatres were able to resist Churchill's advice and conduct campaigns according to the military needs.
Obviously we judge the raid with perfect hindsight, making it easy to see how flawed and even doomed the operation was. It is likely that everyone involved thought it would be successful. So for Roberts (and the others) there really is no 'blame', only an equal share of the responsibility.
