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Member Responses: Following are several member editorials. The first is a response to the history and editorials in the Third Quarter newsletter that dealt with the tragedy at Dieppe. The next two address turning points in WW2. While most are familiar with the major well-known battles, such as Pearl Harbor and Stalingrad, there are many lesser know events which also had a large impact on the course of the war. Two of which are suggested in these papers. |
Dissenting View:
Major Gen. Ham Roberts
By: Michael D
James P wrote a good article in the last NWHA newsletter that discussed the question of "blame" for the Dieppe Raid. While it is a subject that has filled entire volumes, there is one small facet in particular that I would like to address. Jim was correct in his assessment that Roberts had no choice but to lead his division in this raid; however, little has been published as to the circumstances for his removal from command afterwards. Jim puts forth the theory that he was a scapegoat; it is a widely held belief, in fact. Some evidence would seem to indicate this belief is yet one more myth surrounding Dieppe.
Jack Granatstein, in his book The Generals, tells us better than anyone previously about his dismissal."The tragedy of Dieppe, contrary to widespread public perception, did not immediately destroy Roberts's (sic) career, whatever it may have done to his spirit. Instead, in March 1943, (Lieutenant General Harry) Crerar, his corps commander, reported that in recent exercises Roberts had demonstrated a lack of the high tactical abilities required of a division commander in mobile operations. The next month, Roberts was placed in command of Canadian Reinforcement Units in Britain... Goronwy Rees, a British officer seconded to the planning staff for Dieppe, wrote twenty years later that Roberts at no time revealed 'either the intellectual ability nor the powers of command which would have fitted him for the terrible task which was entrusted to him.' Harsh as that assessment was, it was likely true, and Roberts had to go. Command in the Second World War was for the young and fit."
Roberts was 51 years old in April 1942.
Jim's comments about Roberts in the postwar era seem to be correct; he did indeed refuse to blame others for the outcome of the Raid, which was to his credit. And it must have been a terrible burden for him. But I would suggest he was not unfairly treated; he was allowed to rebuild his shattered division, and in the end, like so many great Canadian officers from Worthington on down the list, was released from active service due to his age. That his division may have performed badly in exercises after Dieppe is understandable (six battalions had to be rebuilt to varying degrees from scratch; from individual training up to section, platoon, company, battalion, and finally brigade and divisional level). Unfortunately, there don't seem to be too many references that discuss the degree to which his losses at Dieppe affected his command ability. It is possible Jim is more correct than the historical record shows, but from this passage in Granatstein's book, I would suggest he doesn't appear to have been a scapegoat. Doubtless many veterans would feel different, perhaps even Roberts himself felt that he was unfairly treated. I would be interested in seeing more documented evidence one way or another.
Granatstein's book The Generals is highly recommended; Granatstein is a former Canadian officer, and more recently the director of the Canadian War Museum.
Thornton's PIAT
By: Tony S - 3rd Para Bde
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force-June 15, 1944
General Eisenhower announces that Allied forces will be withdrawn from the Normandy Beachhead beginning today due to the heavy allied losses, and defeats. With the British and Canadian beachheads already evacuated, the small American Beachhead has been under constant counterattack and bombardment by German Panzer Forces. Remaining forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible. General Eisenhower has submitted his resignation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff....
Although this press release is of course fictitious it very possibly could have come true if not for the courage of one British Airborne Soldier, a PIAT, and one PIAT round.
It was the morning of June 6th 1944, D Company, Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry along with attached troops had landed by glider and had seized and held the vital bridges over the Caen Canal and the Orne River, along with a vital crossroads the "T-junction". Although well equipped their sole means of repelling German Armored advances was the dreaded PIAT. The PIAT was a short-range infantry anti-tank weapon. It had numerous shortcomings one of which was the inability to reload quickly. PIAT gunners had a saying, "hit it with the first shot because you wont get a second". The commanding officer, Major John Howard knew that they would likely face a German counter attack and hoped he and his men would not have to fight Panzers with PIATS and small arms. Major Howard started receiving reports of German Armor approaching his position. They were approaching the vital "T-junction" the main arterial from Benouville to Le port, and Caen and the invasion beaches. Approaching the British positions were 6 Tanks, German infantry that outnumbered the British 4 to 1, and supported by a battery of 88's. In his defensive position was Sgt. "Wagger" Thornton, he had the one remaining operable PIAT and two PIAT rounds. The "Ox and Bucks" held their fire so as to not reveal their positions and luring the leading German MK IV tank into the killing zone. Sgt. Thornton coolly waited until the tank was well within range and fired. The PIAT round struck the front of the tank almost dead center, penetrated the interior and set off all of the ammunition inside. The German Forces withdrew reporting that the British troops had heavy anti-tank guns set up at the Bridge. The German tank then sat in the middle of the "T-junction" blocking movement for any heavy vehicles. This prevented the use of this vital road for a German counter attack.
What if Sargeant Thornton had missed? Surely the superior numbers and armor would have overwhelmed the lightly armed British Airborne Forces. The rest of 6th Airborne Division would have been hard pressed to stop a determined German attack, the paratroops were scattered and were just starting to form into effective fighting units. German Colonel Von Luck, commander of the 125th Panzer Grenadier Regiment has stated that if he had use of the "T-junction" and bridges he could have supported the attack on the British beachheads by the 21st Panzer Division. An attack that would have succeeded if the Germans had sufficient troops, which the 125th would have provided. Of course if the German 21st Panzer Division had succeeded in penetrating to the British and Canadian beachheads the landing would have become a debacle and likely a second "Dieppe". If the Commonwealth landings had failed we can also argue that the bulk of the German armored force, which was used to defend the Caen region from the British and Canadians, would have then been free to encircle the American Beachheads and similarly annihilate them. Something else to consider is the enormous casualties endured by the British and Canadian forces in Normandy facing the German Panzers. This was due to the fact that the Allies even in 1944 did not have a tank capable of consistently defeating the front line German tanks. With the bulk of the German armor now facing the Americans and with criminally poor anti-tank weapons the Americans would have been decimated like the Canadians were later around Caen.
Invasion of Norway
April 1940
By: Rob M - 3rd Para Bde
Few campaigns of World War 2 are less well known than that in Norway in the Spring of 1940. Usually a listing of Germany's early conquests will run from Austria, to Czechoslovakia, to Poland, and finally to France. Forgotten is the campaign in Norway in early 1940, fought after the defeat of Poland and prior to the invasion of France. While the campaign was militarily and politically a victory for Germany it can be considered Germany's first major strategic blunder, and a turning point in the war.
I believe that the army, government, and people of England were unprepared for war, and that only time could save England in 1940. Hitler had not intended to invade Norway, and by doing so he delayed the invasion of France and sapped badly need resources. When France was defeated and Germany finally turned towards Britain it was too late in the year and the navy and airforce too weakened to conduct the invasion.
Hitler had not intended to invade neutral Norway. The action only took place when it appeared that Britain and France were going to break that neutrality themselves. Germany's war production depended heavily on the iron mines of northern Sweden and their trade routes that ran through Norway. If the Allies were allowed to occupy Norway these resources would be lost. It would also allow the Royal Navy to once again establish a blockade of German ports, an action which had proven so debilitating to Germany in WWI. To forestall these plans Hitler ordered a surprise attack on Norway on April 9th, 1940.
The German army successfully repeated their blitzkrieg tactics and overwhelmed the defenders. The fighting lasted until early June, but effective resistance in most of the country had long before been overcome. The German navy, however, suffered severe losses with three cruisers, ten destroyers, and six submarines sunk, and four cruisers and six destroyers heavily damaged. The German air force also suffered, losing 242 planes. In addition, after the conquest a full air wing was stationed in Norway.
France was invaded in early May 1940, a month after it had originally been scheduled. On June 25th France signed an armistice, and Germany turned its attention to Britain. By late August the Royal Air Force was on the breaking point; its airfields under constant attack and its pool of pilots dwindling away. Their relief came when Goering, under great pressure from Hitler to immediately defeat the RAF, switched the attack to London. He had been told that the invasion of England must be postponed if air superiority could not be established within days. Goering switched tactics to try and draw the RAF into one last battle and unwittingly saved them by focusing on civilian targets. The experienced crews and planes lost in the fighting in Norway, and the air wing that ineffectively remained stationed there, were badly missed. The Luftwaffe failed and the invasion was cancelled.
If Germany had not lost the naval and air resources and campaign time, I believe it could have mounted an invasion attempt. Could Britain have held? Probably not, considering the huge amount of equipment lost at Dunkirk and the casualties within the regular army suffered in the defense of France. The decision to invade Norway may very well have saved Britain, and Europe.
